Key Risk Factors:
· Insurgency in the North East
· Communal, ethnic or religious
contentions in the country
· Increasing poverty, unemployment and
youth exclusion
· Merger of opposition parties and
possible violent disagreement over leadership and candidates
· Activities of militant youth groups
· Contention over candidates including
zoning of presidential or gubernatorial candidates
Key Mitigating Factors:
·
Coordinated
activities of election security stakeholders;
·
Disbandment/Regulation of cults, militia and vigilante
groups
·
Training for journalists on conflict sensitive
reporting:
·
Prosecuting
of Electoral Offenders
Political Context
The merger between the
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), All
Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and other smaller parties, has provided an
opportunity for opposition parties to align and challenge the dominance of the
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). This however will also provide the backdrop for
a keenly contested election in 2015. The zoning arrangement for the presidency
is also a key issue that will define the face of the 2015 elections and
possible security consequences.
Across the six geopolitical zones,
other factors will define the elections. These include the persisting state of
insecurity from the insurgency and activities of militants and vigilante
groups, the high stakes of election as
a result of the availability of derivation revenues, the ethnic heterogeneity
that makes elite consensus more difficult to attain, as well as the difficult
environmental terrain that makes policing of elections a herculean task.
Preparations for the Elections
The political
temperature across the country is heating up in preparation for the 2015
elections. While some state governors are up for re-election, most others are
serving out their second terms. The implication is that most of the states are
open for grab by either of the major parties and will therefore make the
electoral contest fiercer in 2015 both within the political parties and in the
general election. With the coalescing of the major opposition parties into APC
discussions, scheming and permutations are going on in all the states. Despite
the increasing political activities, there is no indication that the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other relevant agencies
are doing much at the regional level in preparation for the 2015 elections. The
voters register is yet to be updated, the relevant amendment to the electoral
laws are yet to be carried out and there seem not to be election specific
security plan and strategy for the region despite its history of electoral
violence.
Gender Dimension
Gender dimension with
respect to access to political power is a recurring challenge as women
political representation remains very marginal. Because of the diversities of
the six zones, there is no uniformity in women’s political space and public
attitude to women politicians. Therefore, while some states have done
relatively well in women representation, others have not. For instance,
Adamawa, Yobe, Taraba have elected women into the National Assembly, Gombe and
Bauchi are yet to do so. Most of the states Assemblies have no women
representation. Across board, we are yet to achieve gender parity in political
representation, which makes the realization of the target of 35% affirmative
action as set in the National Gender Policy (NGP) far from been attained.
However, the number of women candidates for elective positions have increased
in the last few years, and we expect more of these candidates to emerge for the
2015 election, but there may not be any appreciable progress unless the
socio-economic and political obstacles are addressed.
Presence and Activities of Non-State Actors
There are several
non-state actors involved in security related activities and therefore lots of
vigilante groups in all the states. In North central zone, the spate of
violence and the rise and dominance of armed non-state actors that are
increasingly challenging state capacity have become serious threat to security.
For instance, the emergence of a group- the Ombatse
(meaning time has come), which was responsible for the massacre of over 60
security personnel in Nasarawa state are clear reflections of the fact that the
Nigerian state is increasingly failing in its responsibility to protect,
thereby, ceding its monopoly over the instruments of coercion to some armed
non-state actors. Conflicts between pastoralists and nomads in Benue, Nasarawa
and Plateau States have led to deaths and huge
displacements of persons in these states, with little or nothing to show for,
as it relates to the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of these heinous
crimes.
In the North West, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina have a
history of youth militancy, particularly the yan’daba, thus electoral politics is always an opportunity to
perpetrate violence on behalf of their principals. Sokoto, a hitherto quiet
state has in the last 8 years been experiencing a rise of political violence
due to the growing notoriety of Area Boys (a militant youth group in Sokoto).
With the level of violence in the region in the last three years, the north
east has one of the worst cases of small arms and light weapons. There may also
be huge presence of military assault weapons in the hands of the militant
groups. The zone has in the last 10 years produced militant youth groups – the
Boko Haram and Ansaru being the extreme ones. Others are ECOMOG in Borno state,
Yan’Kalare and Sara-suka in Gombe and Bauchi state respectively.
The activities of
various violent political gangs, disguised as security outfit across the South
West states also call for concern. The Odua People’s Congress (OPC), especially
in Lagos state,
Operation Burst in Oyo state, among others, constitute serious security
threats. Although many of the vigilante groups, like the Bakassi Boys in the
South east, have been dismantled officially, many of them exist informally and
have been implicated in cases of assassination, robbery, kidnapping and
communal violence. The high level of youth unemployment also creates a ready
pool of youths that politicians can mobilise to use violence to achieve
political power. In the South South, militias and cults were implicated in electoral fraud
and voter intimidation in the 2003 and 2007 elections. Some of the militias and
cults transmogrified to the militant groups that were involved in the
insurgency in the region.
Violent Hot Spots
Identification of
violence hotspots by states showing places to keep under close security watch
for possible outbreak of violence before, during and after the elections. We
categorized them using traffic light signals (green, amber and red) to indicate
levels of threat; green indicating stability/lowest threat states and red
indicating the highest threat level/ most volatile states. Key influencing
factors here are whether the governor is up for re-election, degree of control
by incumbent and relationship with the federal government, stability of
internal state party politics, questions of zoning, whether the ruling party or
opposition controls the state, history of violence, and lastly activities of
vigilante/militants/cultists/insurgents.
·
RED: NC – Nasarawa, Plateau, Benue;
NE – Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi; NW – Kaduna, Sokoto; SS – Rivers, Delta;
(None for SE and SW)
·
AMBER: NC – Kogi, Niger; NE – Gombe, Taraba; NW – Kano, Kastina; SE –
Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Imo; SS – Edo, Bayelsa; SW – Lagos, Oyo, Ogun
·
GREEN: NC – Kwara; NW – Jigawa,
Zamfara, Kebbi; SE - Abia; SS – Cross River, Akwa Ibom; SW – Ondo, Ekiti, Osun;
(None for NE)
Synthesis of
security threats
I.
Insurgency: The NE region is currently faced
with violent extremism and three of the states are under emergency rule. If the
situation is not properly managed, this can be a huge threat to the 2015
election in that region. The other challenge is if the federal government tries
to use the military presence in these states to rig or manipulate the electoral
process, this can generate violent reaction.
II.
Communal Violence: A number of states in the
region are faced with communal violence. The violence is often associated with
politics. It is therefore important to
respond quickly to communal, ethnic or religious contentions before they get
further entangled in electoral politics.
III.
Electoral manipulation: Any attempt to rig the
election in most states can generate huge violent reaction. The 2011 violence
in some northern states were associated with perceived vote rigging.
IV.
Increasing poverty, unemployment and youth
exclusion is a major risk. Many of these youth are exposed to drug, small and
light weapons and are susceptible to manipulation and used as party thugs.
V.
Activities of the militant youth groups: There
is a proliferation of militant groups and vigilantes across the country. Though
there have been efforts to regulate or demobilise some of the groups in some
states, there is however no guarantee that they will not bounce back during the
election when politician will become desperate for their services. The process
of demobilisation should therefore be comprehensive, in a way that the young
people can be empowered through gainful and sustainable socio-economic
activities.
VI.
Merger of opposition parties and possible
violent disagreement over leadership and candidates: With the merger of the
three major opposition parties, there is definitely going to be a huge
contention over positions, leadership or candidates, some of the contentions
could spiral into violence.
VII.
Contention over candidates including zoning of
presidential or gubernatorial candidates: There are emerging contentions over
where the president of the country should come from. This is a continuation of
the controversy that preceded the 2015 election and has continued to shape the
national politics since then. Like what happen in 2011, if the ruling elite do
not manage the situation properly, it could escalate into a huge national
crisis.
VIII.
Already, the emerging signs have pointed to the
possibility of pre-election, election-day and post-election violence. The
deployment of federal might to factionalise the NGF is an example of such
tendencies. With the merger of opposition parties, the contest will possibly be
stiffer and the likelihood of violence higher.
Mitigating
factors and Recommendations
i. Election related stakeholders –
including security agencies, INEC, political parties and civil society groups must commence preparation
for the 2015 election and mainstream conflict management in their plans.
Governments at all levels should pay special attention to the violence
hotspots with a view to
empowering and equipping the agencies for effectiveness.
ii. Disbandment/Regulation of cults, militia and vigilante groups: The state
governments and security agencies
should work to disband cults and militias and regulate non violent vigilante
groups that are often hired to intimidate voters and opposing party
supporters. The mobilisational capacity of political parties and elites
as they engage the services of youths as political thugs and vigilantes will be a key defining element of the general elections in the run up to 2015.
This must be checkmated more
proactively by the INEC and
the relevant security agencies.
iii. Training for journalists on conflict sensitive reporting: The manner the
media has been reporting and is likely
to report political conflicts has implications for violence. A cursory
examination of newspapers reveals
high levels of sensationalism which if left un-moderated will contribute to
violence. Media practitioners should be
exposed to training on reporting of political conflicts to mitigate risk of
their reports becoming
triggers for violence.
iv. Sustained
engagement among key stakeholders such as INEC, security agencies, civil
societies, religious and
community leaders is central to re-instilling confidence in the people of the
electoral process, coupled with
political will on the part of governments at all levels in supporting peaceful
and credible elections
remains a key priority.
v. The government needs to respond to
the socio-economic vulnerability of young people.
vi. There is need to overhaul the weak
criminal justice system in the country, with specific reference to prosecuting perpetrators of violence and
checkmate the proliferation of weapons and emergence of armed-non state actors. This is the only way that the
entrenched culture of impunity in the country can
be reversed.
vii. All existing ethnic, religious and
communal contentions should be properly managed to avoid escalation during election. All political
parties should be persuaded to sign a peace memorandum, stating their commitment to eschew violence and work
peacefully before, during and after the election
