EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The
cycle and integrity of elections are critical to the democratic process that
any perceived or real threat to elections is often interpreted as a threat to
the sustenance of democracy. Since Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999,
elections had been characterised by security and administration challenges,
resulting in discredited outcomes and associated cases of off-cycle elections.
The November 18, 2017 governorship election in Anambra state is the latest in
the list of off-cycle elections in Nigeria. The elections will take place in a
largely tensed atmosphere, shaped by the resurgence of Biafra separatist
agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), large number of political
contestants, huge deployment of state security forces, influence of godfather
politics, prevalence of cultism, and proliferation of arms, among other
factors.
It
is against this backdrop that CLEEN Foundation embarked on an assessment of elections security threat to the November 2017 governorship election in
Anambra State. The study examined the real and
potential election security threats in the state, focusing on each of the three
senatorial districts. It adopted a mixed-methodology, involving both
qualitative and quantitative research methods, to generate vital information on
the nature and extent of threats to the November 18 elections.
The report
identified some critical actors whose conduct could undermine the peaceful
conduct of elections in the state. These include IPOB agitators, party thugs,
political parties, armed groups (Cultists), INEC officials, security agents,
judiciary, media, traditional institutions, vigilante groups, and CSOs. The way
and manner these actors behave before, during and after the elections could
constitute election security threats. The findings of the quantitative survey
revealed that the activities of IPOB agitators constitute the greatest
elections security threats (70%). The study showed that the group has the
capacity to threaten the election through subtle
intimidation of voters, propaganda operations using especially social media,
and confrontation with security agents and electoral officials where there is
weak or non-existent security presence. Besides the IPOB, other actors
whose actions, inactions or misconduct could pose significant threat to the
forthcoming elections are party thugs and political parties (67%), armed groups
(61%), INEC (56%), and security agents (55%). The potentials of the conduct of
the judiciary and media to contribute to the outbreak of electoral violence
were ranked below 50%. However, there is widespread concern of possible misuse
of social media by IPOB agitators, political contestants and some aggrieved
individuals to instigate violence.
The study
further identified some communities or locations that are possible flashpoints
of electoral violence and security breaches (see Map below). Factors such as
the potency of IPOB's threat, politics of Godfatherism, allegations of
gubernatorial candidates' connections to cult groups, undue exploitation of power
of incumbency, and desperation of opposition parties to capture the state
constitute main sources of election security threats. The threat level is shaped
by factors such as high population density (especially youths), huge presence
of IPOB members, stronghold of the major political heavy weights or contestants,
and history of electoral violence. Locations considered to be chiefly at risk
are Atani, Ekwulobia, Fegge, Niger/Head Bridge (Onitsha), Nkpor, Obosi, Okija, Okpoko, Ozubulu,
Ubuluisiuzo and Uli. Places such as Abagana, Aguleri,
Agulu, Amansea, Anaocha, Aroma, Ifete, Nkwele
Ezunanka, Nnewi-Ichi, Nsugbe, Ogbunike Ajalli, Ogidi,
Okpuno, Orafite, Osumenyi, Ukpo and Umunze
are equally potential flashpoints of violence.
The study envisaged low voter turnout in
the forthcoming governorship election. Several factors could account for it.
First, is the traditional apathetic disposition of most residents of the state.
Second, is the threat by IPOB for election boycott, with promise of death for
those who vote in the election. Third, and as a corollary to the above, is the
possibility of further militarisation of the state in view of the potency of
the IPOB threat. There is also widespread
concern of possible post-election violence in the event that APGA loses
the election to APC.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the major findings as
well as those common to each senatorial district, the study proffered the following
recommendations for the key stakeholders.
Federal Government:
a.
Desist from deploying the military into
streets during the elections in order to avoid heightened militarisation of the
state that could exacerbate voter apathy.
b.
Develop a robust strategy for rapid
deployment of the military to flashpoints of violence, to be activated only when
and where there is serious security breaches that overwhelm the capacity of the
police.
c. Task
the Ministry of Information to collaborate with the National Orientation Agency,
INEC and DSS to create a formidable
influence operation team (IOT) that could proactively counter IPOB's propaganda,
or hate speeches by desperate politicians and faceless individuals during the
election period.
Anambra State
Government:
a.
Leverage Anambra Broadcasting Service to
heighten the synergy between the media and security agencies in the state to
address people's concerns about securitisation and militarisation of the state.
b.
Encourage religious leaders, Town Union
executives and community leaders to mobilise their people to vote in peaceful
manner and assist in disseminating credible electoral information at the
grassroots.
c.
Sustain public enlightenment programmes
through town hall meetings, radio, television and social media on the dangers
of youth involvement in cultism and consumption of hard-drugs to mitigate their
consequences for the elections.
For
Security Agencies:
a.
Implement robust and
'right-sized' deployment of security agents and intelligence operatives across
the 21 LGAs to ensure efficient security provisioning before, during and after
the election. This will ensure that the right size of security forces are
deployed for the right mission.
b.
Establish a Special Inter-Agency
Monitoring Team that will commence and sustain active patrolling of the roads
in the state to appropriately deal with corrupt and overzealous security agents
who are taking advantage of the huge force deployment to engage in the
molestation, maltreatment and extortion of people.
c.
Properly publicise non-classified
aspects of security arrangements for the election to boost the confidence of
the people to come out and vote. In partnership with the political parties,
media and CSOs, they can agree that carrying a Voters Card will be the only
acceptable means of identification for moving about during the voting hours. Exception
would be made for those on essential duties.
d.
Establish a special committee with
representatives of political parties, CSOs and traditional leaders to conduct
transparent demobilisation of vigilante groups and other informal policing
outfits. Involving other diverse stakeholders will give credibility to the
exercise and boost the confidence of opposition parties that are doubtful of
past exercises.
e.
Leverage the findings
of this study and others that have provided evidence-based insights on
potentials security flashpoints to evolve or fine-tune security incident
response plan for the elections.
f.
Maintain professional
conduct in the discharge of their responsibility, especially when conducting
stop-and-search operations, handling of suspects, management of crowd and
dispersals of illegal gathering during the election.
g.
Sustain active and visible patrolling of
all vulnerable streets and spots while the election is on, especially in areas
with large students and youth population.
h.
Create toll-free lines for timely
reporting and response to incidents that could undermine peace and security
before, during and shortly after elections.
For
INEC:
a.
Ensure early
distribution of non-sensitive materials to all LGA headquarters, and make
adequate preparation to deliver all other materials promptly on the election day
for timely commencement of voting.
b.
Emplace a special social media team
(SSMT) that would constantly scan the social media horizon to counter false
allegations or rumours that could undermine the legitimacy of the electoral
process. The team would equally serve as a platform for entertaining complaints
from the public as well as giving real-time update on the progress of the
elections.
c.
Provide and
appropriately communicate to all stakeholders its platform for ensuring
transparent counting, collation and announcement of results.
d.
Ensure that the posting of electoral
officials is done a night to the election. This will ensure politicians do not
get to know which electoral officer would work in any polling unit.
e.
Capture the biometrics of all ad hoc
staff during training and their identity confirmed on the day of election to
ensure that only trained ad hoc staff work on the day of election.
For
Political Parties:
a. Develop and sign Peace Commitment Charter (PCC).
Through the Charter, the parties and their candidates would sign to abide by the
provisions of the electoral law, desist from using political thugs, and shun
hate and provocative speeches that could trigger electoral violence.
b. Adequately train their party agents to understand their rights and responsibilities in
order to avoid acts that could compromise INEC officials or the electoral
process.
For
CSOs and Media:
a. Partner
with the INEC and political parties to continuously and properly educate the people as well as counter misinformation, falsehood
and incitation that are capable of dissuading people from voting or triggering
violence.
b.
Deepen collaboration with INEC and
security agencies in area of security information sharing and voter education.
c.
Continue to monitor and provide
impartial report on the entire electoral process to help protect the integrity
of the elections.
d.
Conduct security awareness and
sensitisation programme to encourage healthy relation between the people and
state security forces.
e.
The media should report only verified
information obtained from trusted sources and promote peace messaging.
For
Voters:
a.
Should have the confidence to cast their
votes and report observed electoral irregularities to appropriate quarters.
b.
Seek for updates and information on election
matters through the right channels like the INEC information desk rather than
depend on social media.
c.
Abstain from spreading unverified
electoral information via social media.
