Presentation by Innocent Chukwuma, Executive
Director, CLEEN Foundation
at the Centre for the Study of African Economies,
(CSAE), Oxford University, March 16, 2012
Introduction
·
Thank Dr. Cheeseman of CSAE for
inviting you and framing the topic.
·
Stress that neither the law nor
the social order it tries to reinforce and maintain in Nigeria is in the overall
interest of the overwhelming majority of Nigerians who are poor and vulnerable.
Give examples of where the law and maintenance of it have short-changed the
people.
·
Note that this inherent
contradiction predates Nigeria’s independence and it’s at the root and heart of
rising insecurity in the country as there is simply no incentive for the poor
to be part of law and order maintenance in the country.
·
Inform that other jurisdictions
have done a better job at managing the contradictions in society by improving
state capacity to respond through a medley of carrot and stick approaches.
·
Note however that in Nigeria,
we have spentmuch more time on nation building than we have on state building.
·
Highlight that the consequence
is that the ability of the state to respond to situations that seriously
threaten law and order is consistently suspect due to legitimacy,
accountability and capability deficits.
Focus
of Presentation
Stress that the theme of the presentation is
a broad canvass that allows you to focus on what you really want to talk about.
Inform however that it would be deemed a misuse of time if you fail to dwell in
some ways on the Boko insurgency in the north, militancy in the delta and of
course the Occupy Nigeria protest in January, which were and still are major
law and order challenges in the country.
Inform that you would like to structure the
presentation through attempting to answer five questions around the three
trending topics and after invite the audience to disagree, agree, comment or
ask questions, which would hopefully make the discussion a lively and
participatory one.
The questions are:
·
In what ways is the Boko Haram
insurgency different from the other law and other challenges we have
experienced in recent years in Nigeria, such as Niger delta militancy and OPC
activities in the Southwest?
·
How has the mainstream media and
commentators presented and analysed the group’s attacks?
·
What has been the response of
stakeholders in government and civil society to the insurgency?
·
What are the missing links?
·
What difference did the occupy
Nigeria protests in January 2012 make?
Inform that you would begin with the first question.
I.
Differences between Boko Haram and others
Begin by noting that to many commentators,
especially those in the south, Boko Haram is simply a northern equivalent of
OPC activities in the 90s and Niger Delta militancy in the early 2000, aimed at
attracting power back to the north by making the country ungovernable and
forcing president Jonathan to hand over to their political elite.
Observe that a closer look at the groups
and the goals they claim to pursue indicate that they differ from these other
groups much more than they seem similar:
a)
The insurgency is over values,
believes and faith even if the underlying factors of deprivation, poverty and
alienation are similarly felt across Nigeria. This makes it much more difficult
to resolve when compared to conflict over resources and political
representation.
b)
Unlike Delta militancy and OPC,
it is rooted in the mass of ordinary people in the north, especially the youths
most of who are living on the margins of society – Alma Jiri.
c)
The northern political elites
are yet to hijack and blunt the goal of the group unlike the case of delta
militancy or OPC where the political elites were in the driver seat of the
agitation and therefore easy to be brought to the table and make deals with.
d)
The state has rendered Boko
Haram leaderless in a visible sense by killing Mohamed Yusuf and driving other
leaders underground. This makes it a dangerous and difficult group to deal with
in terms of finding political solution. In the case of delta militancy, the
leaders were known and on occasions flown to Abuja in presidential jets.
Similarly, in the case of the OPC, their leaders – Dr. Frederick Faseun and
Gani Adams – were easy to reach and make deals with either in jail or in their
homes.
e)
The Boko Haram groups have
demonstrated the capability to mount low-scale and audacious attacks in
different parts of the country than any militant groups in Nigeria have a ever
done. And they seem to be getting better at their art and thus frightening the
state and the people in more nightmarish manner than their predecessors. Thus
their capacity to ignite the country is not in doubt.
f)
They also appear to have more
international connection through the Sahel region than other groups making them
a clear and present danger to the corporate existence of Nigeria.
II.
Media Interpretation and Explanation of Boko Haram
·
Inform the audience that media
reporting of Boko Haram’s insurgency and commentators analyses of the groups
activities are sharply divided into northern and southern perspectives with
very few middle grounds.
·
What this means is that to get
a balanced perspectives on the issue you have to read reports from media
outlets based in the south and the north. Therefore for every story you read on
the group’s activity in the Punch, Sun, Guardian or the Nation, you have to
read Daily Trust or Leadership to get a balance.
·
In the southern-based media,
prominence is given to attacks involving southern and Christian targets. You
are likely to read such screaming front-page stories: ‘Boko Haram kills 30
southerners’, Gunmen kill 12 Igbo, Yoruba in Adamawa. When the victims are
mostly Moslems and northerners, you may likely find it buried in inside pages
with such sober titles as ‘Boko Haram kills Another 3 in Maiduguri’.
·
Commentaries on the attacks are
often slanted to give the impression that northern elites are behind it to
wrestle power from Jonathan and the south.
·
However, the northern-based
media outlets are also not free of slanted reporting. In their stories,
northern victims are highlighted to show that they suffer the most.
·
Their commentators also explain
away the attacks as a function of poverty and deprivation as if poverty is a
trigger rather than a risk factor in violence.
·
They are also increasingly
asserting even though without any empirical evidence that there is link between
the violence in the north and the current revenue sharing formula of the
country, which appear to privilege the south south where the president comes
from.
·
The result of these varying
accounts of and interpretation of Boko Haram’s phenomenon is that Nigeria is
today perhaps more divided than it has ever been. This makes it much more
difficult for law enforcement and security agencies to get the desired support
they need from the communities to respond effectively to the existential threat
posed by Boko Haram to the Nigerian state.
III.
Stakeholder Responses: Government and Civil society
·
Stress that collectively,
stakeholders in government and civil society have not responded adequately to
the existential threat posed by Boko Haram and other extreme groups in Nigeria.
Government
response
·
Beginning with the government,
observe that it appears divided into three camps:
i.
Security solution camp versus
political solution
ii.
Northern camp versus southern
camp
iii.
Jonathan continuity camp versus
2015 handover camp
·
Stress that these divisions
have made it difficult for the government to speak with one voice on the
situation, with the security camp led by the national Security Adviser
stressing that they are winning the battle and urging for total wipe out of the
groups, while the political camp are calling for dialogue and for the group to
lay down their arms.
·
Observe that so far that the
security solution camp appears to be gaining upper hand with the dramatic
increase in both the 2011 and 2012 budgets on security, with 2012 crossing the
one trillion benchmark.
·
Note however, the ascendancy of
the political solution camp buoyed by the killing of the two expatriates in
Sokoto and the attendant external pressure by powerful nations on the
government to find a lasting solution to the menace of the group.
Civil
society response
·
Observe that beyond occasional
statements in the media, civil society as a collective has largely remained
silent on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria when compared to the way the sector
responded to the withdrawal of fuel subsidy.
·
Highlight the limited efforts
of groups like CLEEN Foundation and others have done in response to the
phenomenon:
i.
Public opinion survey on call
for dialogue with the group
ii.
Forum on responding to Boko
haram and other extreme groups in Nigeria.
iii.
About to commence study on
security governance and conflicts in West Africa including Nigeria.
IV.
Missing Links
Highlights the missing link in the fight
against Boko Haram:
·
Profound disconnection between the
policy and scholar communities in Nigeria, which has led to very little
informed and dispassionate account of what is going on and how they could be
responded to, which would feed into policy making. Academics seems to be
essentially on leave of absence as far as Boko Haram’s insurgency is concerned.
·
Lack of cohesion in government
about what needs to be done, which has made it difficult for the government to
tap into its resources to deal with the phenomenon as a result of deep division
and suspicion among the major functionaries.
·
Lack of political will within
the government to deal with the tripod of issues behind the seeming
invincibility of the Boko Haram group:
i.
Alma Jiri phenomenon and other
destitute children drawn from neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger
and Chad.
ii.
Financial support from some
politicians and wealthy people to the group, which enables it to procure arms
and weapons, training and compensation for the wounded and families of dead
members.
iii.
Influence of local ideologues
that frame the violent and hate ideology of the sect.
·
Rising poverty, deprivation and
alienation of young people across Nigeria and in particular the north amidst
the wealth of the country, which is being squandered and wasted by those in
political and economic authorities.
V.
Occupy Nigeria Protests and the Difference it made
Note that in
the midst of despondency and divisions created Boko Haram’s attack, the Occupy
Nigeria protests in January in response to fuel subsidy
removal by the government came to present a different picture of what is
possible and forward looking as far as Nigeria is concerned:
·
It started as a protest against
fuel subsidy removal but ended or introduced a new phase of struggle and
campaigns against waste and corruption in government.
·
United Nigerians across ethnic,
class and religious divides.
·
Showed that Nigerians can fight
back against oppressive system if the messaging and mobilizations are couched
in such away that they connect and resonate with the livelihood challenges
confronting the people.
·
Brought out the middle class to
for the first time in a long time join the struggles of the people for better
deal in the Nigerian state.
Major lessons
However, the
major lessons of the protests and while it could not be sustained beyond one week
are follows:
·
Leadership of such a protest in
the future should no longer be left in the hands of the trade union movement.
·
A national platform is needed
to drive the process of building on the gains of the protests.
·
Social media has become a key
tool for catalysing change in Nigeria that can no longer be ignored.
·
A national opposition party is
needed to work with civil society groups for change in Nigeria.
·
Various measures are currently
being initiated currently in Nigeria to take forward the lessons of Occupy
Nigeria Movement and build on it.
Conclusions
There is a lot to make one feel despondent
about Nigeria with regard to law and order situation. But there is also a lot
more to make you assured and hopeful that change is around the corner.
Don’t give up on Nigeria!
Thanks You!
